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the purpose of substantiating or
qualifying the statements of B; (3)
a recent prosecution following a There has been no confrontation, a
bank robbery the defendant at- right guaranteed by most constitutempted to introduce into evidence tions.
the dying declaration of a third
There are several exceptions to
party, made before the sheriff of the general rule. Among these is
another jurisdiction, confessing the the rule which admits a dying deccrime for which the defendant was laration in a homicide case when
on trial. Held: The dying declara- the death of the declarant is the
tion was not made by the party reason for the trial. WIGMORE,
whose death was the subject of the EVIDENCE §1432. Clearly the printrial and the declaration was in- cipal case does not fall within this
admissible as hearsay. Newton v. exception. Is there any reason
State, 71 P. (2d) 122 (Okla. 1937).
why the exception should be thus
The ruling of the court in this case limited in its application? The
is in accord with the majority rule rationalization of the exception is
in this country. WIGMORE, EVI- usually presented under two main
bENCE (2d ed. 1933) §1430.
arguments: (1) The dying declarThe hearsay evidence rule is ap- ant is so near death as to be conplied in the instance where there strained to tell the truth; (2) it is
is a statement made out of court clearly public necessity to admit
testified to or produced in court to the last words of the victim of a
show the truth or falsity of the out secret murder in order to convict
of court statement: i. e., if in court the murderer who would otherwise
A testifies that B reported or states be protected by the lack of eyethat a certain event X occurred, A's witnesses. Under the first argutestimony that B said certain things ment the courts are generally very
is good, but if this testimony is strict concerning the nearness of
death and the knoledge on the
used to prove event X there is or
ror, since this is hearsay evidence. part of the declarant that death is
imminent. Starkey v. People, 17
WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §1361.
There
are at least three reasons usually Ill. 17 (f855); Digby v. People, 113
Ill.
123 (1885). In the case of the
recited in support of this rule: (1)
The report of B was not given un- second argument, that of necessity,
der oath; (2) There was no oppor- it is interesting to note in cases
tunity for cross-examination for where there has been adequate
EVIDENCE-ADMISSIBILITY OF DY-.
ING DECLARATIONS.-[Oklahoma] In
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evidence of another nature, nevertheless the dying declaration of the
victim was admitted in the case
against the defendant. Commonwealth v. Roddy, 184 Pa. 274, 39
Ati. 211 (1898). In that case necessity was defined as being not
the exigency'of a particular case
but the general necessity to preserve the public peace and prevent secret murders.
There has been another exception drawn by statute in certain
states to allow the admission of a
dying declaration where the declarant is the victim of a criminal
abortion. OMo CODE ANN. (Throckmorton, 1936) §12412-1. At common law if there was an indictment for criminal abortion and
the introduction of the dying victim's declaration was necessary to
procure a conviction the defendant
would go free. Railing v. Commonwealth, 110 Pa. 100, 1 Atl, 314
(1885). If on the other hand there
was an indictment for manslaughter
on the same fact situation the dying declaration of the victim was
then competent evidence to procure a conviction. It was the recognition of the ridiculousness of
the technicality on the part of the
legislatures which gave rise to
statutes like the one cited above.
In the principal case the accused
would have been acquitted if he
could have shown that some person other than himself had committed the crime for which he was
on trial. However, when he attempted to use the confession of
a third party made on his deathbed, evidence which tended to
prove that some person other than
the defendant committed the robbery, he was met by this restrictive
rule of evidence and precluded
from thus proving his innocence.
The reasons usually given for al-

lowing dying declarations only
when the declarant's death is the
subject of the trial are these: (1)
No oath. (2) No opportunity for
cross-examination. (3) Such declarations are given on the pointl of
death under the consequent physical and mental stress, when the
memory may not be clear and the
declarant's mind may be warped in
its conclusions and opinions. (4)
No opportunity for confrontation
of the witness by the accused. (5)
There is a clear opportunity for
fraud. In the face of these objections most courts allow a dying
declaration to be introduced into
evidence in a homicide case where
the declarant's death is the reason
for the trial.
There must be some reason why
these objections are strong enough
to rule out evidence of this nature
in a robbery case when they are
not sufficient to prevent the use of
the same sort of evidence in the
homicide exception where a man's
life may hang in the balance. Either
the objections apply with greater
force in one case than in the other
or else the factor of necessity is
stronger in one case than in the
other. That there should be any
difference in the force with which
the objections apply seems highly
illogical. Can there be any greater
necessity for allowing such a declaration in a homicide case? In
one breath the courts say that dying declarations make very objectionable evidence, and in the next
they confine the use of such evidence to a case where a man's life
is in issue. The courts apparently
fear fraud in the ordinary criminal
cases. There would be scarcely
any greater chance for fraud in a
robbery case than in a homicide
case and it would seem to be more
in keeping with justice to run the
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risk of occasionally acquitting a
guilty man rather than always to
convict a man when, as in the prin.cipal case, the defendant's case" was
based to a large extent upon the
dying declaration. There is some
authority for the position opposite
from the principal case. Donnelly
v. United States, 228 U. S. 243, 277
(1912) (Holmes' dissent); Hines
v. Commonwealth, 136 Va. 728, 117
S. E. 843 (1923): WIGmORE, EviDENCE §1432 if. It should be noted
that these authorities require that
there be some substantiating evidence which tends to support the
truth of the dying declaration. In
the principal case there was evidence which seemed to corroborate
ihe confession of the third party;
e. g., the confessor's wife testified
that she had seen bank notes from
the robbed bank in her husband's
possession and certain implements
such as an acetylene torch and
hammer were found in the location
described by the declarant.
In an old North Carolina case in
which a father was suing for loss
of services of his daughter by seduction the court admitted the
girl's dying declaration to identify
the defendant. When the defendant took an appeal on the basis of
the strict rule confining the exception to criminal cases of homicide
where the death of the declarant
was in issue, the supreme court of
the state was not bothered by the
fact that the case was not even a
criminal trial and admitted the
evidence. The words of the court
were these: "Can the practice of
receiving it (dying declaration) to
destroy life, and rejecting it where
a compensation is sought for a civil
injury, derive any sanction from
reason, justice or analogy?" M'Farland v. Shaw, 4 N. C. 187, 1"90
(1815). It would seem that age

has not weakened the force of this
argument nor time removed its appropriateness. This rule has been
followed in other cases in North
Carolina as well as in Kansas.
Tatham v. Andrews Mfg. Co., 180
N. C. 627, 105 S. E. 423 (1920);
Williams v. Randolph and Cumberland Ry. Co., 182 N. C. 267, 108 S.
E. 95 (1921); Thruston v. Fritz,
91 Kan. 468, 138 Pac. 625 (1914).
See N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1935)
§160.
There is another exception to the
general hearsay rule which might
be used in such a case as the present one. It is the admission in evidence in a civil suit of the declaration of a third party made against
his own pecuniary interest. It has
been pointed out that the reason
why the rule no longer applies to
declarations against penal interest
is because of an historical accident.
WVIGMORE, EVIDENCE §1476. Of course
in the case where a declaration
against penal interest is also a dying declaration, the argument that
it is true because against the interest of the declarant is not so strong,
unless he is a religious man. because the penal threat is removed.
On the other hand there is no particular reason why a third party
would confess a crime which he did
not commit simply to free an accused man. Although the weight
of authority is with the court in
the principal case, it would seem
that the weight of reason supports
a conclusion opposite from the one
arrived at in this case and many
others like it.

. EDWIN

FEDERAL

CRIMINAL

0. WACK.
STATUTES -

VALnrrm.-[Federal] The expansion of the Federal government into the field of crime has gone comparatively unnoticed by legal com-
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mentators, in their focusing on the
problems raised by government
control in the fields of agriculture
and industry.
Recent Supreme
Court and Federal court decisions
have involved the validity and
constitutionality of six major criminal statutes enacted by Congress
in recent years.
(1) The Lindbergh Act (1934)
48 Stat. 781, 782, punishing the
transporting of a kidnapped person
in interstate commerce by the
death penalty if the jury does not
recommend mercy, and creating a
presumption that state lines have
been crossed where the victim has
not been returned in seven days,
was the basis of convictions in
Gooch v. United States, 297 U. S.
124 (1936); Bailey v. United States,

74 F. (2d) 451 (C. C. A. 10th,
1934); Kelly v. United States, 76
F. (2d) 847 (C. C. A. 10th, 1935)
The statute was also upheld in
United States v. Parker,19 F. Supp.
450 (D. C. N. D. N. J., 1937). The
Bailey case considered and rejected
the arguments that the statute was
invalid because the sentence of life
imprisonment imposed was "cruel
and unusual" punishment within
the prohibition of the Eighth
Amendment and that the interstate commerce power does not
embrace the statute.
The Fugitive Felon Act (1934)
48 Stat. 782, a part of the Lindbergh Act, punishes a person fleeing in interstate commerce from
prosecution or to avoid testifying
in felony cases. In United States
v. Miller, 17 F. Supp. 65 (D. C. W.
D. Ky., 1936) this was upheld as
within the plenary power of Congress as to interstate commerce.
(2) The Anti-Racketeering statute (1934) 48 Stat. 979, was sustained by the District Court,
Northern District Illinois, in United
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States v. Gramlich, 19 F. Supp. 422
(1937). This act makes it a felony punishable by one to ten years
imprisonment or by fine of $10,000
or both, to obtain the payment of
money or other valuable consideration by the use of threats or force,
violence, or coercion when such
conduct is in connection to any act
in any degree affecting interstate
or foreign commerce.
(3) Similarly, the Extortion Act
(1932) 47 Stat. 649, which punishes
the sending of threatening communications through the mails, was
sustained in Sutton v.. United
States, 79 F. (2d) 863, (C. C. A.
9th, 1935).
(4) The National Firearms Act
(1934) 48 Stat. 1236-1240, requires
registration of machine guns, rifles
and sawed-off shotguns and taxes
dealers on the sale and the persons
transferring such objects. Sonzinsky v. United States, 86 F. (2d)
486 (C. C. A. 7th, 1936) and United
States v. Adams, 11 F. Supp. 216
(D. C. S. D. Fla., 1935) are convictions under the act.
(5) The constitutionality of the
National Bank Robbery Act (1934)
48 Stat. 783, punishing the robbery
of national banks and providing the
death penalty where a person has
been killed in such a robbery, has
never been attacked, but a conviction thereunder was affirmed in
White v. United States, 85 F. (2d)
268 (Ct. App. D. if C., 1936).
(6) The National Stolen Property Act (1934) 48 Stat. 794, in
United States v. Miller, 17 F. Supp.
65 (D. C. W. D. Ky., 1936), punishes anyone who transports or
causes to be transported in interstate or foreign commerce, stolen
goods, securities or money to the
value of $5,000 or more, knowing
the same to be stolen. Also punished are those who receive or dis-
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pose of such property, knowing the
same to be stolen.
The power of Congress to pass
such legislation is predicated upon
the power to levy taxes and to control interstate and foreign commerce. -The taxing power has not
been so widely used as a basis of
criminal statutes: the main examples, prior to the National Firearms Act, are the Anti-Narcotic
Drug Acts. The Act of 1914, 38
Stat. 785, which made sales unlawful except to persons giving orders
on forms issued by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, was
held to be a valid revenue measure,
as its prohibitions bore a reasonable relation to the enforcement of
the tax. United States v. Doremus.
249 U. S. 86 (1919). The Act, as
amended in 1918 to levy, in addition to the occupation tax upon
dealers and importers, a stamp tax
upon the drug packages, was challenged in Nigro v. United States,
276 U. S.332 (1928). But the Supreme Court definitely cleared the
way for subsequent regulatory enactments based upon the taxing
power by declaring that the right
of a resident of a state to buy narcotics is subject to the power of
Congress to lay an excise tax on its
sale-and the legislation's constitutionality is not affected by the fact
that it may incidentally discourage
the use of the thing taxed.
More widely used as the source
of criminal enactments by Congress
has been the power over interstate
and foreign commerce conferred in
Art. I, §8(2), of the Constitution.
The leading case under the commerce clause is Gibbons v. Ogden,
22 U. S. 1 (1824), which defined
the broad character of that power
in the words, at p. T88, "'Commerce' describes the commercial
intercourse between nations and

parts of nations, in all its branches
and is regulated by prescribing
rules for carrying on that intercourse." Under the aegis of such
a mandate Congress has seen fit
to enact a multitude of criminal
statutes based upon the commerce
power.
Outstanding cases involving these
examples, prior to those of the last
decade, are: United States v. Popper, 98 Fed. 423 (D. C. N. D. Calif.,
1899) upholding the prohibition
against sending contraceptives in
interstate commerce; The Lottery
Case, 188 U. S.321 (1903) by which
the Congressional Act for the Suppression of Lotteries was validated;
Hipolite Egg Co. v. United States,
220 U. S_45 (1911) sanctioning the
Pure Food and Drug Act of 1906;
Hoke v. United States, 227 U. S.
308 (1913) and Caminetti v. United
States, 242 U. S.470 (1916) wherein the White Slave Traffic Act of
1910 was held to be within the
commerce power; Weber v. Freed,
239 U. S. 325 (1915) in which the
Congressional ban upon prize-fight
films was upheld, and Brooks v.
United States, 276 U. S.432 (1925)
which found the National Motor
Vehicle Theft Act Constitutional.
This current of decision leaves no
modern support for such supposed
barriers to Congressional regulation as was announced in Anderson v. United States, 71 U. S. 604
(1898), to the effect that interstate
commerce must be directly affected
before Congress may legislate to
control.
The only real obstacle to the extension of the commerce power as
has been done since .1932 would
seem to be Hammer v. Dagenhart,
247 U. S. 251 (1918), which held
that the act prohibiting transportation in interstate commerce of
goods produced in factories em-
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ploying child labor was invalid as
encroaching upon the powers reserved to the states by the Constitution. There the causal connecnection between child labor and
interstate shipment was held too
indirect to justify Congressional
interference. The evil, child labor,
was complete before the goods
were in interstate commerce and,
therefore could not be a causal
element. In all of the criminal
statutes under consideration, the
illegality of the criminal act for
which punishment is sought is accomplished before transportation is
accomplished, and under the ruling in Hammer v. Dagenhart
(supra), had the Supreme Court
seen fit to so limit the power of
Congress, it might have done so.
The Supreme Court might have
justified expansion of Federal
power into the field of criminal
law, hitherto a state matter, by
holding that the individual violator himself was the evil which
passed in interstate commerce.
However, the Court was influenced
by considerations of public policy
as regards the individual state's inadequacy to cope with organized
national crime. In line with the
enlightened attitude of the Federal
government toward our social and
economic ills, it is reasonable to
expect a further expansion of Congressional regulations over those
matters touching the field of criminal law.
JEAN RODGERS.

IN

JUDGMENT AND SENTENCE-DELAY
CORPUS.EXECUTION-HABEAS

[Federal] The question of a prisoner's right to appeal from alleged
improper detention arises once
again. Petitioner was sentenced to
six years in the Federal penitentiary and committed to the marshal
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After
for delivery, "forthwith."
being placed in the county jail, the
petitioner was relinquished to the
state officials who tried and sentenced him to the state penitentiary. Upon his parole over six
years later, the United States marshal again took custody and incarcerated the prisoner in the Federal
penitentiary under the original
commitment, from Which detention
petitioner seeks a writ of habeas
Denied in the district
corpus.
court. On appeal, reversed. Smith
v. Swope, 91 F. (2d) 260 (C. C. A.
9th, 1937).
The Federal statute of June 29,
f932, provides that all prison sentences shall begin on the date of
delivery of the prisoner to the
except
designated penitentiary,
when prisoner is committed to a
jail, "to await transportation."
(1932) 47 Stat. 381.
It has long been held that a
Federal marshal has no authority
to act other than that given him
by the order of the court. In re
Jennings, 118 Fed. 479 (C. C. E. D.
Mo., 1902), and certainly, the commitment in the present case gave
the marshal no authority to postpone sentence or deliver the prisoner to state authorities.' The
question thus arises whether sentence can be satisfied by any other
means than Federal imprisonment.
Whether the imprisonment is to
be in a jail or a penitentiary goes
to the nature and, extent of the
punishment and is of the essence
of the sentence, for a penitentiary
sentence is infamous. So there are
pronouncements that a sentence to
imprisonment in a penitentiary
cannot properly be executed in a
jail. Ex parte Wilson, 114 U. S.
417, 428 (1885); In re Mills, 135 U.
S. 263, 267 (1890); Gorovitz v.
Sartain, 1 F. (2d) 602 (D. C. N.
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D. Ga., 1924). However, the marshal is under a duty to convey the
prisoner within a reasonable time
to the penitentiary. Prior to the
statute, the Federal rule on sentences delayed in execution through
no fault of the prisoner was that
such delay would not work to the
prisoner's detriment. In re Jennings, 118 Fed. 479 (E. D. Mo.,
1902); Ex parte Sichofsky, 273 Fed.
694 (D. C. S. D. Cal., 1921) See
White v. Pearlman, 42 F. (2d) 788
(C. C. A. 10th, 1936) (sentence of
prisoner mistakenly discharged before expiration of his sentence continues to run while he is at liberty); Gorovitz v. Sartain, 1 F. (2d)
602 (D. C. N. D. Ga., 1924). The
reasoning is that the prisoner had
started service of his sentence and
the improper action of the marshal
could not cause its abatement. The
ordinary practice for setting the
commencement of sentence was
that sentence should begin to run
with delivery to the designated
penitentiary.
Hynes v. United
States, 35 F. (2d) 734 (C. C. A.
7th, 1929); Eori v. Aderhold, 53 F.
(2d) 840 (C. C. A. 5th, 1931); Yutz
v. Pearman, 33 F. (2d) 906 (D. C.
E. D. S. C., 1929). See (1902) 32
Stat. 397.
There was sufficient
variance, nevertheless, to provide
the courts with a flexible rule.
United States v. Sautter, 17 F.
Supp. 326 (D. C. M. D. Pa., 1936)
(credit given defendant for time
spent in jail awaiting trial, defendant having been tried and sentenced prior to the 1932 Act);
United States v. Marrin, 227 Fed.
314 (D. C. E. D. Pa., 1915); In re
Morse, 117 Fed. 763 (D. C. Mo.,
1902) (suspended sentence: term
of beginning sentence is to be computed from time of actual incarceration, not from time unnecessarily fixed in the judgment). See

Bernstein v. United States, 254 Fed.
967 (C. C. A. 4th, 1918) (court can
subsequently change time fixed for
commencement of sentence if for
any reason execution has been delayed); Miller v. Snook, 15 F. (2d)
68 (D. C. N. D. Ga., 1926). Holdings that sentence started to
run upon pronouncement, or at
least commitment, were prevalent
enough to allow courts to make
use of them if the occasion demanded. Dimmick v. Tompkins,
194 U. S. 540 (1904) (sentence to
hard labor in a state prison does
not commence to run until arrival
at prison and if prisoner secures a
supersedeas pending appeal his
detention meanwhile cannot be
counted as part of his time); Miller v. Snook, 15 F. (2d) 68 (D. C.
N. D. Ga., 1926) (prisoner sentenced to penitentiary, sentence to
run from date of sentence).
Under the statute, however, a
new obstacle obstructs similar
holdings. A strict interpretation
of it might well be made to read to
the instant prisoner's detriment.
The courts have, however, taken
judicial notice of the fact that marshals are accustomed to make only
periodic trips to the penitentiary
with prisoners and, hence, of necessity, the prisoners are jailed, "to
await transportation."
Trant v.
United States, 90 F. (2d) 718 (C. C.
A. 7th, 1937). Since a sentence once
started is continuous (assuming
no fault on the part of the prisoner), White v. Pearlman, 42 F.
(2d) 788 (C. C. A. 10th, 1930), the
federal statute seems to leave the
law unchanged in this situation. In
the light of the probable intent on
the part of the legislature not to
affect these anomolous cases, the
decision in this instant case can
hardly be condemned.
State courts seem to hold more
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rigidly to the idea that punishment
is the essence of a prison sentence
and the only means of satisfaction,
regardless of delay not the fault of
the prisoner. Ex parte Vance, 90
Cal. 208, 27 Pac. 209 (1891); State
v. Piper, 103 Kan. 794, 176 Pac. 626
(1918); State v. Birbiglia, 155 La.
597, 99 So. 462 (1924); Ex parte
Holden, 31 Okla. Cr. 133, 237 Pac.
622 (1925). However where the
defendant has never been imprisoned after being sentenced, his
subsequent arrest and commitment
are valid. Middleton v. State, 60
Ark. 1'08, 254 S. W. 342 (1923) (unsatisfied sentence against one permitted to remain at large on bail
may be enforced by subsequent arrest and commitment); Mann v.
People, 16 Colo. App. 475, 66 Pac.
452 (1901) (defendant cannot escape punishment because of magistrate's failure to commit defendant to jail pending appeal); Egbert
v. Tauer, 191 Ind. 54, 134 N. E. 199
(1921) (delay of judge in issuing
commitment did not satisfy defendant's sentence); Miller v. Evans.
115 Iowa 101, 80 N. W. 198 (1901)
(expiration of time of sentence
from day fixed in judgment not a
satisfaction thereof, when sheriff
failed to issue mittimus); Ex parte
Underwood, 94 Tex. Cr. 157, 248
S. W. 55f (1923) (defendant at
large on appeal bond cannot claim
his term began upon affirmance of
sentence by appellate court). Both
of these groups of cases are usually
based on the rule that time for
starting punisiment is no part of
the sentence, and thus can be
varied after sentence is passed.
State v. Cockerham, 24 N. C. 167
(1842). See WHARTON'S CanNiAL
PROCEDURE (10th ed., 1918) §1864;
(1919) 3 A. L. R. 1572. There is
a small minority, however, holding
that delay of the state cannot im-

pair the prisoner's "rights" and
that the day on which the prisoner
is sentenced will be reckoned as a
part of his imprisonment. Kirby v.
State, 62 Ala. 51 (1878); Corporate
Authorities of Scottsboro v. John-

son, 121 Ala. 397, 25 So. 809 (1899)
(time of sentence expired while
defendant was at liberty by court
order, pending payment of fine).
See State v. Snyder, 98 Mo. 555, 12
S. W. 369 (1889) (defendant who
submitted to erroneous sentence
freed; jury had previously fixed
term at six months, which time
had expired); Ex parte Myers, 44

Mo. 279 (1869); In re Webb, 89
Wis. 354, 62 N. W. 177 (1895) (order of commitment made more
than six months after the sentence,
wherein defendant was sentenced
to six months imprisonment or
payment of a fine; held, order
without authority, even though defendant failed to pay the fine).
The basis of many of the rigid
state holdings is Dolan's Case, 101
Mass. 219

(1869)

and Hollon v.

Hopkins, 21 Kan. 459 (1879). Both
involved attempts of escaped convicts to reduce their sentence for
time spent at large. From such
facts it is extremely doubtful
whether these holdings were ever
meant to extend beyond these
unique facts. See Hollon v. Hopkins, 21 Kan. 459 (1879). A realistic, if unlegalistic opinion is Exparte Bugg, 1'45 S. W. 831 (Mo.
App., 1912), in which the judge
would decide each case upon its
own peculiar facts, following such
course as will best promote the
ends of justice. While attractive,
such lack of standard can hardly
be condoned in the light of general
policy.
Although the result of the present case seems acceptable, a better
remedy is sugggested in Gorovitz
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v. Sartain, 1 F. (2d) 602 (D. C. N.
D. Ga., 1924), which would require
the prisoner to seek habeas corpus
and move to have-his sentence cariied out immediately upon unreasonable delay in execution, rather
than wait until toward the end of
his sentence to raise the objection.
Such a rule seems commendable
in that it would not be a burden
upon the good faith petitioner.
while it would serve to discourage
bad faith applications.
JACK SIMONS.

TRIAL AND APPELLATE PRACTICEREVERSIBLE ERROR.- [Federal]
It

has been said of appellate courts
in this country that they "tower
above the trials of criminal cases
as impregnable citadels of technicality." Kavanaugh, Improvement
of Administration of Criminal Justice by Exercise of Judicial Power
(1925) 11 A. B. A. J. 217, 222. As
an instance in support of this generality we offer a recent case in the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals involving an appeal from a conviction under the Narcotics laws. Ah
Fook Chang v. U. S., 91 F. (2d)
805 (C. C. A. 9th, 1937).
The situation presented was as
follows: the jury having been in
deliberation for some five hours,
the foreman came to the judge in
his chambers and in the presence
of attorneys for the defense and
prosecution, informed the judge
that the jury wished to be advised
whether the confession of one of
the defendants in the case could be
considered as evidence against the
other. (The latter was present and
not in custody when the confession
was given.) The judge, over defense attorney's objection, gave the
same instruction on the matter
that he had previously given in
the course of the trial in open

court, viz., that the confession of
the one could be used as evidence
against the other defendant. The
foreman retired and a few minutes
later the jury returned to the court
room with a verdict against both
defendants. The Circuit Court of
Appeals felt that this incident required the granting of a new trial.
Error was found in the fact that
the transaction occurred in chambers without defendants personally
present, whereas a trial is supposed
to take place in a courtroom with
defendants in attendance, providing they wish to be. The court
was content with merely pointing
out this error. Apparently it was
not enough to require reversal in
itself-probably just something,
impliedly, to add to the other and
more basic error, viz., the instruction to the jury in the absence of
counsel. Counsel were absent, it
was said, for the foreman relaying
the instruction did so in the jury
room where counsel were necessarily excluded. "On that theory
reversal is required," the court
stated.
The court had pointed out that
not all error is reversible error.
The next step, logically, would
have been to have applied some
test to determine if their second
or basic error was reversible error. Had they proceeded in this
manner they might well have
asked, as a sensible test, "Has the
error probably affected the verdict?" Applying that test here, the
conclusion must be that the error
does not call for reversal. The instruction as a matter of substance
was not error; the error lay in giving it to the foreman alone to carry
back to the jury, so that counsel
could not be present when it was
given the jury. Would the absence
of this error have changed the vpr-
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dict? All counsel could have seen
to was that the foreman tell the
jury the evidence could be used.
The jury's prompt verdict indicates
they were told the evidence could
be used, for they did use it without
doubt. Thus presence of counsel,
which would have prevented error,
could not have affected the verdict;
and under this test there was no
reversible error.
Doubtless the court considered
this line of reasoning, because the
dissenting judge accepted and
enunciated it. But still the majority felt that "the error may lave
Without arbeen prejudicial."
ticulating any reason for that feeling, the court stated prejudice
would be presumed. A case from
the neighboring Tenth Circuit
Court of Appeals, Little v. U. S.,
73 F. (2d) 861 (C. C. A. 10th, 1934)
was cited as standing for a rule of
presumption in such a situation.
But a careful search through that
case discloses no announcement of
a rule of presumption. The incident involved in the Little case
consisted of the judge's sending the
court stenographer into the jury
room to read the instructions from
her notes. Probably this case is
stronger on the facts as supporting
reversal for error than the present
case, for the reasons that the sanctity of the jury room properly must
remain inviolate, and that it was
altogether possible the stenographer had misread or wrongly
emphasized portions of the instructions. But even if it is a fair factual precedent as showing a situation another court found to require
reversal, no rule of presumption is
used to get the result. The rule
or phrase that is employed in the
Little case as a guide is that where
error occurs which within the
range of a "reasonable possibility"
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may have affected the verdict, reversal is in order. This phrase was
imported from the opinion of Mr.
Justice Cardozo in Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U. S. 97, 113 (1933).
No burden of proof was by this
rule placed on the appellee as is
true under the rule of presumption
applied in the present case. Under the rule in the Little case the
court must find a "reasonable possibility" of injury from error and
may not "presume" it even though
appellee has not shown absence of
injury.
No mention was made in the
present case of the Federal statute
applicable, (19f9) 40 Stat. 1181.
The pertinent portion of this stat"On the
ute reads as follows:
hearing of any appeal, certiorari,
writ of error, or motion for a new
trial, in any case, civil or criminal,
the court shall give judgment after
an examination of the entire record
before the court, without regard to
technical errors, defects, or exceptions which d6 not affect the substantial rights of the parties." Divergent views have been expressed
in various Circuit Courts of Appeal
as to the effect of this amendment.
United States v. River Rouge Co.,
269 U. S. 411, 421 (1925). A full
consideration is given the two
views in the Little case, supra. It
is pointed out that some of the
circuits, including the Ninth, have
taken the view, since the amendment, that an appellant must establish affirmatively, substantial eiTor
These
and resulting prejudice.
Ninth Circuit cases, of which no
mention was made by that court in
the present case are Marron v.
United States, 18 F. (2d) 218 (CC. A. 9th, 1926); and Miller v.
United States, 47 F. (2d) 120 (C.
C. A. 9th, 1931). In the former
case the following language is used
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at p. 219: "It is argued primarily
that every error is deemed to be
prejudicial. Such a presumption
does not arise." In the latter case
the court says, at p. 121, 'In the
absence of a showing that substantial rights were prejudiced .
appellant has no ground for complaint." Clearly these expressions
show no rule of presumption had
existed in the Ninth Circuit previous to the present case.
The other view, the one professedly adopted in the Little case,
is to the effect that the amendment
did not change the ancient doctrine of "harmless error" that had
long pertained in the Federal
courts. This idea appears in a
sense fallacious. Under the doctrine of "harmless error" the whole
record was examined, and if it
was shown that no injury to substantial rights had resulted from
the error it would be ignored. If
there was no proof either of injury or of lack of injury from the
error reversal would be in order,
predicated upon a reasonable possibility of injury or upon a presumption of injury. The latter
aspect of the doctrine of harmless
error, presumed injury, had been
the subject of much adverse criticism. First announced in England
about 1835 in the highly technical
Court of Exchequer, it was later
adopted by other English courts
and by most of the American
courts. It was abolished in England by the Judicature Acts; but
it continued to flourish in this
country and was the gravamen of
the "considerable agitation" which
finally brought on the 1919 amendment to §269 of the Judicial Code.
1 Wigmore, Evidence, (2d. ed.
1923) §21; Sunderland, The Problem of Appellate Review (1927)
5 Texas L. Rev. 126, 147; Orfield,

Criminal Appeals (f937) 27 J.
Crim. L. 668, 675, 679. There can
can be little doubt that the presumed injury aspect of the doctrine of harmless error was intended to be abolished by the
Sunderland, supra
amendment.
p. 147. The Supreme Court of the
United States has so declared.
Berger v. United States, 295 U. S.
78, 82 (1935).
With an understanding of this
background of the 1919 amendment
it seems the court might well find
in it a direction to them to reverse only in case a reasonable
possibility of injury from error appeared. Probably no burden of
proof of injury was intended to be
placed on the appellant. Cf. Haywood v. United States, 268 Fed.
But
195 (C. C. A. 7th, 1920).
despite the ambiguous wording the
least that can be said of the statute
is that it indicates a public disapproval of technical reversals such
as would often result if injury
must be presumed.
It is true that the same result
may be obtained whether the judge
purports to follow the reasonable
possibility of injury formula or
whether he merely presumes injury. But under the former rule
it is incumbent upon a judge, in
good conscience, to show where
lay the dangers of injury; he is
called upon to articulate his "vague
unrest." If it were made clear to
the courts that this much is expected of them under the statute,
and if they would accept the responsibility, it seems that a great
step would be taken to lessen frivolous reversals. But, unfortunately, under our constitutional
system of division of powers, nothing can be done about it if the
courts refuse to enunciate clearly
their reasons. No statute can en-
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join upon them this duty; nor, indeed, can any statute eradicate
technical reversals.
Sunderland,
supra p. 147; Orfield, supra p. 680.
It is common knowledge that not
infrequently the real reasons do
not appear in the opinion. This
can hardly be called intellectual
dishonesty; oftentimes the force
moving the decision never arises
above an emotional state, "an intuition more subtle than any articulate major premise," Justice
Holmes was wont to say. This
moving force is with difficulty put
in words, if, indeed, it is commonly recognized. Sometimes it is
recognized and expressed, but for
fear of appearing to decide on
"extra-legal" grounds, the decision,
purportedly, is based on technical
legal dogma. See Baker, Reversible Error in Homicide Cases,
(1932) 23 J. Crim. L. 28.
The present case may be examined in the light of some of these
extra-legal considerations. We are
loath to believe that when the
court said it would presume injury
from an error that under no reasonable possibility could have injured the defendants, it had no
laudable motive for employing
such dialectics. But when an attempt is made to indicate what
may have been the unexpressed
forces moving the decision, forces
that, perchance, the judge himself
did not consciously consider, the
ground becomes unsteady. However, a few suppositions will be indulged in of what might have been
factors motivating the result. First,
the defendants were members of
the Chinese race, a mother and her
son. Foreigners are often treated
kindly by appellate courts. Baker,
supra p. 33. Second, the officers
searched the son's room without a
warrant, finding opium on a table.
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"There is a dispute in the evidence as to whether or not the
entry made by the officers was
permissive." The court could not
find evidence clearly showing the
entry not to be permissive; but
they might well have been skeptical that it was permissive, picturing the scene of a startled
Chinaman suddenly confronted by
police officers demanding entrance
into his room, he well knowing
damaging evidence of law violation
was in full view on a table. But
it was the Chinaman against the
officers and the lower court had
believed the officers; the appellate
court had to accept, on paper, the
finding that defendant had waived
his constitutional right against unreasonable searches and seizures
by permitting the entrance. Third,
the signed statements of the defendants were obtained after a
questioning lasting intermittently
from 3 o'clock in the afternoon
until midnight.
Again it was
mother and son against the officers
on the issue of volition in the giving of the statements. Again the
trial court had believed the officers
and "the trial court's judgment
thereon must be sustained."
A
possibility of oppressive beforetrial treatment may elicit leniency
in the appellate court. Baker,
supra p. 43.
If it were known what the judges
understood to be the condition of
criminal investigation and administration in Hawaii, a better opinion could be given as to whether
or not any of the above considerations influenced the decision. In
the absence of any information on
the subject of conditions there, it
would seem to be a better guess
that none of these factors was important in motivating the decision.
Indeed, the nationality of the de-
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fendants considered with the nature of the crime, and the apparent
reasonableness of the police operations, would seem to militate for
affirming the conviction.
At any rate the court indicated
that the objection on which reversal was predicated, viz., the outof-court incident, constituted a
more serious question. In considering the unexpressed reason
for reversing on this harmless
error, the conclusion must be that
here is another instance of the ageold conflict between formalism and
teleology; between a system of administration calculated to guard
against injustice generally, and
justice in the particular case. (This
conflict is peculiarly acute in criminal law where loss in the particular case may prevent the defendant from profiting later by a good
precedent set at his expense, as he
might do, for example, in the field
of property law.) The court in the
present case simply looked to
form, and ignored effect in the particular case. Usually it cannot be
said that a court is wrong in choosing one or the other of these approaches; it is a matter of fundamental differences. But there are
instances where the result in the
particular case is so absurd, and
there is such slight possibility that

the error will occur again to disturb the even course of administration, that one feels constrained
to criticize.
Such an instance is the present
case. However, not all the fault
may be placed on the appellate
court. There is little excuse for
the lethargy of the trial judge in
conducting part of the trial in his
chambers; there is little excuse for
the failure of counsel, both for
prosecution and accused to object
to the out-of-court procedure.
(In fact counsel for defendants objected merely to the substance of
the instruction, and by requesting
that a different instruction be
given in the chambers really invited the error.) But the upper
court proved itself to be an "impregnable citadel of technicality"
in failing to get a plausible result
despite the errors of those below.
Furthermore, its technique, first, of
finding its decisive doctrine in a
case which contained no such doctrine, second, of overlooking its
own recent decisions holding that
the doctrine did not exist in the
Ninth Circuit, and third, of ignoring a statute which authorities had
said outlawed such a doctrine in
the Federal courts, can hardly be
justified.
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